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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the evolution of democratic politics and continuing lack 
of success in entrenching liberal democracy in Nigeria. By examining the 
underlying causes of Nigeria’s purported slowness or imperviousness to the 
revival of effective democracy, the paper hopes to identify pertinent security 
challenges that have coalesced to impede her path to political stability and 
development.  
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Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it 
 George Santayana (1863-1952).1  
 
Introduction 
Like other regions around the world, Africa experienced seismic political changes 
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Suddenly, a region whose politics had been reputedly 
distinguished by its apparent viciousness, rampant ethnocentrism, genocidal conflicts, 
authoritarian one party states, endemic corruption, moribund economies, military rule, 
encrusted poverty, and massive refugee flows was awash with clear and growing demands for 
change.2 Goaded by the spectacular processes of change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, the wind of democratization gathered momentum across the African continent after 
the late 1980s. With the demise of the Cold War and the collapse of communism providing 
moral justification and validation for allegedly fundamental western values – democratic 
governance and free market economies – major western governments donned conquering and 
imperious attitudes.3 Spearheaded by the United States and the United Kingdom, and 
supported by multilateral institutions, which they ride roughshod over, the western powers 
began to impose political liberalization and multiparty elections as a political condition for 
foreign assistance.   
The political conditionality exerted additional pressures on African governments, 
which were already rattled by the deleterious effects not only of structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) but also the on-going local demands for political reforms.4 These factors 
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had net effects of simultaneously delegitimizing the state and its leadership while also 
bringing about the emergence or further emboldening of new leaders and civil society 
organizations demanding even more rapid political reforms. With unprecedented and 
complementary changes evolving in apartheid South Africa, an embryonic appreciation for 
democratic principles (with its tenets of accountability and popular participation) as a 
necessary condition both for the maintenance of political stability and the enhancement of 
economic development began to crystallize in many parts of Africa.   
Unfortunately, despite the initial hopes, multipartyism quickly proved inadequate 
panacea or mechanism for arresting the rapid decline of Africa’s political economies. 
According to some authors, the conservative pro-democracy organizations that emerged as a 
result of the multi-pronged pressures placed too much emphasis on a political agenda to the 
detriment of socio-economic matters and programs.5 As such, although political pluralism 
resulted in the supplanting of some military dictatorships and one-party states by multiparty 
politics in many parts of Africa, the initial results proved fragile, conservative and, like the 
preceding political arrangements, unresponsive to the putative needs and wishes of the 
majority of Africans. In essence, despite broad enthusiasm for change and political reforms, 
political liberalization and multipartyism failed to bring about fundamental transformation of 
the African political landscape by the end of the 20th century.   
The early pessimisms notwithstanding, there may be good reasons to believe that 
collectively the democratic gains of the 1980s and 1990s may presage a profound 
restructuring of social forces within Africa during the first two decades of the 21st century. 
Increasingly, there are fuzzy but clearing indications that despite (or because of) the political 
commotions and conflicts that have marred the African political landscape in the latter part of 
the 20th century, Africans have become increasingly disenchanted with rapacious leaders and 
ineffective governance structures. They are questioning old political taboos, demanding the 
dismantling of authoritarian features, and clamoring for more direct input in their own 
governance. In countries such as Cameroon, Mali, Egypt, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Liberia, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe political 
leaders are being forced to answer harder questions or to resort to repressive tactics just to 
stay in power. Chastised by growing evidence of poor outcomes, many other political leaders 
in countries such as Angola, Benin, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Guinea, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, are beginning to seek or consider less violent means 
to redress long simmering or boiling resentments.   
As with other African countries, Nigeria (see Figure 1) embarked on the path of 
democratic change before 1990. In Nigeria, however, the 1990s witnessed, inter alia, the 
annulment of a costly democratic transition program, the assumption of power by one of the 
country’s most repressive military leader (that of General Sani Abacha), and a perturbing 
increase in communal, ethnic, and religious conflicts.6  Although the sudden death of Abacha 
in 1999 re-opened democratic political space in Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo’s leadership 
failed to quiet restive forces. In some ways, centrifugal forces (religious, communal, regional, 
and class) appear to have been unleashed under Obasanjo – thereby resuscitating questions in 
some doubting quarters not only about the readiness of Nigerians for democratic governance 
but also about the viability of the Nigerian state itself. Yet, it is the same constellation of 
forces through their persistent unwieldiness that gives Nigeria the characteristic of being one 
of the most interesting cases of democratic experiments in the world despite the persistent 
political tensions and crises, stopgap institutional mechanisms, and endless transitional 
processes. Perhaps, Larry Diamond had it right when he noted that Nigeria’s cultural 
pluralism “defies successful management through any but democratic and rigorously 
federalist principles.”7   
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that can keep the fragments of national life together in the face of divergent regional, local, 
religious, class, and sectoral interests, which not only permeate and define Nigerian socio-
political life but also stand ready to rip the state apart in the absence of the dominant cohering 
influence of the center.   
Fifty-two years after achieving political sovereignty, the chronic political instability 
and economic under-performance of the Nigerian state reflect both the unresolved nature of 
the “national question”10 as well as the deep psycho-structural problems that underlie and 
belie the country’s political economy: profound lines of societal segmentation; distorted 
federal system of government; and the resultant damaging impact on societal norms and 
political culture that now characterize the country. Together, those three factors have 
coalesced to create huge and persistent social and political problems in Nigeria, including 
political instability, communal violence, religious conflicts and militancy, pervasive 
corruption, weak economy, decaying economic and social infrastructure, moral turpitude, and 
increasing linkage and entrenchment in international criminal networks.  Also, there has been 
cross-fertilization between the political tensions and poor economic circumstances on the one 
hand and the emergence and growing importance of increasingly militant groups fuelling 
communal violence, including the Oodua People’s Congress (a pro-Yoruba organization), 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and Ijaw youth groups in the Niger Delta, the 
Arewa People’s Congress (a pro-Hausa-Fulani organization), and Boko Haram (the radical 
Islamist sect from northeastern Nigeria).   
Nigeria’s vast heterogeneity (specifically, its ethnic, linguistic, religious, and regional 
diversity) has been an abiding source of her societal tensions and conflicts. The mixture 
serves not only as a source of national strength and potential but also as a seam interminably 
threatening to tear at the core of national unity and posterity. More than anything else, 
Nigeria’s diversity serves not only as the decisive factor that has shaped the high instability 
that characterizes its political economy but also as the principal factor that has rendered 
fruitless all efforts at institutionalizing democratic values and governance within the country. 
All that notwithstanding, a crucial starting point for any assessment of the underlying causes 
of Nigeria’s apparent political instability can be traced to the historical origins of the Nigerian 
federation. Bolaji Akinyemi points out that “there was no Nigeria before Flora Lugard coined 
the name: there were Fulani, Hausa, Tiv, Idoma, Igbo, Ogoni, Ijaw, Urhobo, and Yoruba 
nationalities before there was a Nigerian nation.”11 In essence, the Nigerian state was a 
British construction that purposely ignored the large number of different and competing 
nationalities. As Ochocha accurately observes: “the British colonial masters super-imposed 
the amalgamation on the diverse peoples of Nigeria, not out consideration for the future 
welfare and political stability of Nigeria, but for the economic wellbeing of Britain and also 
for its own administrative convenience.”12   
Although Nigeria may have about 50 ethnic constellations, ethno-linguistic claims 
number between 200 and 500 groupings due to disputes among linguists about parameters of 
differentiation and categorization.13 Nigeria’s ethnic and linguistic plurality remains abiding 
sources and summits of communal, regional, and national tensions and discord.  Although 
three “majority” ethnic groups – Hausa Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba – combine to make up 
about two-thirds of the national population, some of the so-called “minority” groups 
constitute important (numerically and otherwise) segments of the political economy. The 
incessant minority agitations for recognition and relevance as well as their refusal to concede 
the political terrain to the majority groups and their divisive battles for national control and 
supremacy, serve both to enrich and complicate the ongoing struggles to resolve the national 
question and re-institute democracy in Nigeria. According to Suberu, the minority problems 
are “deeply rooted in complex historical and structural processes of pre-colonial and colonial 
incorporation and consolidation of diverse ethnic segments, federal territorial evolution and 
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reorganizations, revenue allocation, and political competition and representation.”14 By 
nurturing and entrenching the hegemony of the country’s three major ethnicities, these 
processes legitimized “the expropriation of the resources of the oil-producing communities as 
part of an official strategy of centralized national cake-sharing.”15 
Nigeria’s first postcolonial rulers (see Table 1) inherited a state made up of three 
regional structures, which were configured by the British to use the majority ethnic groups as 
anchors for the regional governments: Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the southwest 
and Igbo in the southeast. The huge territorial, population, and economic power disparities 
between these regions quickly proved politically ruinous. Quite aside from the differences in 
the level of social and economic development of the ethnically based regions, there was an 
explosive contradiction between the political power of the Muslim Hausa-Fulani of the north 
and the socioeconomic power of the Yoruba in the industrial southwest and the Igbo of the 
oil-rich southeast. Although this arrangement has turned out to be deeply flawed, it reflected 
British thinking that given Nigeria’s ethnic makeup that regionalism should be emplaced as 
the organizing principle for the post-colonial state.  The assumptions were simple and, as it 
turned out, problematic. 
 
TABLE 1 
CHRONOLOGY OF NIGERIAN LEADERS SINCE 1960 
Nigerian Leaders Leadership Timeline 
Tafawa Balewa 
(Northern People's Congress) 
1960-1966 
J.T.U. Aguiyi Ironsi  (Military) 1966 
Yakubu Gowon (Military) 1966-1975 
Olusegun Obasanjo (Military) 1976-1979 
Shehu Shagari (National Party of Nigeria) 1979-1983 
Muhammaddu Buhari (Military) 1984-1985 
Ibrahim Babangida (Military) 1985-1993 
Ernest Shonekan (Military) 1993 
Sani Abacha (Military) 1993-1998 
Abdulsalami Abubakar (Military) 1998-1999 
Olusegun Obasanjo (People's Democratic 
Party) 
1999-2007 
Umaru Yar' Adua  
(People's Democratic Party) 
2007-2010 
Goodluck Jonathan 
(People's Democratic Party) 
2010-present 
Source: Author's compilation 
 
First, was the belief that although the dominant ethnic groups in each region would 
dominate their respective regional governments, no ethnic group would be sufficiently 
powerful to dominate at the center. With about two-thirds of the land mass and over half of 
the population, the Northern Region dominated the center.  Second, was the belief that each 
region would develop a multi-party system, which would help to temper or prevent the 
possibility of parochial dominance at the center by any ethnic group. The actual reality was 
that the regions became one-party monoliths. The Nigerian People’s Congress used its 
narrow ethnic majority in the north (16 million out of 31 million northerners were Hausa-
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Fulani) to control and dominate the entire country. Third, that the constitutional machinery at 
the center would ensure the emergence of effective national governing institutions. The 
problem here was that the regional governments had advantages over the center due to 
established jurisdictional legacy. They not only preceded the federal government by more 
than a decade but also had established Nigerianized bureaucracies, self-contained economic 
systems with their control of the marketing boards, direct access to the international 
economic system, and residual powers through the Independence Constitution.   
Finally, that there would be no discrepancy between political and economic powers 
that could not be easily tackled by the new federalism. A perusal of the 1961 statistical 
figures on regional revenue and personal taxes demonstrate built-in problems. For that year, 
the total regional revenues (exclusive of federal allocations) were accounted for by: the West, 
58.5 percent; the East, 25.7 percent; and the North, 15.7 percent. In regard to national 
aggregate of collected taxes, the percentages were as follows: West, 67.7 percent; East, 27.2 
percent; and North, 9 percent. These figures were substantiated by educational enrolment 
figures.  In 1965, the North with more than half of the national population had 10 percent of 
the national total of all primary school population. For higher education in 1965, Northerners 
made up 8 percent of total student population vis-à-vis 48 percent for the East, 5 percent for 
Lagos, and 39 percent for the West.16  
Thus, this flawed federal structure as well as the equally problematic Westminster 
majoritarian model bequeathed by the British (complete with its winner-takes-all and dual 
executive arrangements), nurtured deep social and political tensions in Nigeria. In the 
absence of mediating influences (which the British provided as colonial overlord) and an 
enabling appropriate history and political culture, Nigeria gravitated rapidly towards political 
bedlam (1961-1966), coup (1966), counter-coup (1966), and civil war (1967-1970) – all these 
within a decade of independence. This is despite the efforts of several governments to address 
serious structural problems inherited from the British colonial government.  Indeed, the 
defective structure of the immediate post-colonial state was a primary causal factor in the 
prolonged political crisis and civil war between 1967-1970 that came hard-on-the-heels of the 
collapse of the First Republic (1963-1966).  
To contain these pervasive tensions and conflicts, virtually every Nigerian federal 
government since independence has devoted considerable attention to issues flowing from the 
structure of the component parts of the federal state.  As William Graf notes, “it is a truism of 
Nigerian politics that the country’s continuing existence as a nation-state hinges on its 
capacity to evolve and maintain an adequate system of federalism.”17 To this end, the country 
has been carved up over the years from the original three-region structure to the present 36 
state alignment that began with the 1962 creation of the Mid-west region from the Western 
Region. When this initial arrangement turned out to be inadequate, the government of 
Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who took power in the second 1966 military coup that 
unseated Major-general Aguiyi Ironsi, reworked the country's federal structure to a 12-state 
arrangement in 1967.18  The wild success of this arrangement both as a tool for saving the 
country from being trampled under the weight of rabid regionalism and as a conduit for 
extending the web of beneficiaries for the massive amount of petro-naira that fuelled the 
political economy after the 1973 oil shock, resulted in further clamouring for new states.19   
In 1976, General Murtala Muhammed expanded the number of states to 19. General 
Ibrahim Babangida expanded this to 21 in 1987 and 30 in 1991. In 1996, General Sani 
Abacha expanded the number of units yet again to the present figure of 36 states. Whatever 
their political benefits, the state creation exercises may have transcended their optimal level 
of usefulness. For one thing, the fact that they were often pursued either during or because of 
deepening fiscal crisis has had a net effect of dangerously fragmenting, distorting, and 
weakening the Nigerian federal system.20 Moreover, the creation of 36 component states and 
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776 Local Government Areas has not solved the problem of minority ethnic group under-
representation. This is especially so given the formal use of these entities – rather than 
population figures and need – as the basis for allocating national financial resource.21  
Furthermore, as some critics have maintained: 
“[The Nigerian national] revenue distribution formulas have been 
repeatedly revised under the pressure of state and sectional interests. While 
federalism has shown itself to be a valuable instrument for managing ethnic 
conflict in Nigeria, genuine federalism has been in tension with the central 
role the federal government plays in distributing oil-generated revenues and 
the centralizing tendency of military rule since 1983.”22  
Ordinarily, federalism is a form of government, which allows for a constitutionally 
mandated division of authority between the center and the constituent parts in such a way that 
each exercises formal responsibility for specific functions and maintains its own institutions 
for the purpose of discharging those functions. The frequent overlapping of jurisdictions and 
functions in federal systems not only render them complex and cumbersome but also have the 
net effect of fostering tensions between authorities at the center and the constituent local 
parts. In Nigeria, however, frequent political instability and the long rule of military 
governments between 1966 and 1999 have had the overall effect of strengthening the center 
at the expense of the component states and local government system. In addition, it also had 
the associated effect of eroding the powers of the judiciary, which under federalism plays the 
key role of adjudicating disputes between the center and local authorities. Those two aspects 
as well as the control by the center of key revenue sectors have combined to give the 
Nigerian federal system a distinct hue marked by its mixed bag characteristics. 
The Nigerian Military: A Dubious Historical Legacy? 
 
“Only a community of fools will entrust its most sacred possession – 
nationhood – yet again to a [military] class that has proven so fickle, so 
treacherous and dishonorable.” 23   
 
One of the most egregious obstacles to democracy in Nigeria can be easily identified 
as the military itself, conceived as a non-monolithic entity or non-unitary actor, which has 
intervened intermittently in Nigeria’s post-colonial politics. Such frequent interference has 
had the cumulative effect of retarding the consolidation of democratic institutions in the 
country, resulting variously in “human rights repression, militarization of society and the 
political landscape, abuse of the rule of law, gross indiscipline, arbitrary proliferation of 
subnational states and local government areas, aggravation of ethnic politics, destruction of 
the productive sectors of the economy and monumental corruption.”24 The military ruled 
Nigeria for nearly 30 years out of its first 40 years of independence. According to Ekineh, 
“No other country in Africa has been as coercively dominated for so long a period by their 
own military as the people of Nigeria.”25 Military dominance of the Nigerian political 
landscape has been so profound since 1960 that its shadowy silhouette remains an 
undercurrent feature of democratic politics in Nigeria today. As Agbaje contends, “it is only 
in this context of military governments that the heavy-handedness of the democratization 
process can best be understood.”26 In addition, the exacerbation of sectarian violence 
(communal, ethnic, regional and, increasingly, religious) should also be understood in terms 
of the actions of the Nigerian military.   
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In many ways, the ethnic and regional strains, which divide Nigerians and their 
politics today, have been entrenched under the military; they also may be found within the 
military. Since General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi’s stint in power in 1966, all five of Nigeria’s 
military regimes have been more or less dominated by northern officers, drawn heavily from 
the Hausa-Fulani elite. In fact, the last three military rulers, Muhammad Buhari, Babangida, 
and Abacha have all been northern Muslims. Given this context as well as the domination in 
the First and Second Republics by northern political oligarchy, southern Nigerians were 
openly sensitive in the run-up to the 1993 presidential elections to the issue of equity in the 
distribution of political power. Although the Nigerian military has often seized power 
through extra-legislative and unconstitutional means, they have justified their actions by 
claiming them to be corrective. For instance, after the coup that ended the Second Republic 
(1979-1983), Major general Muhammed Buhari rationalized the coup thus:  “The corrupt, 
inept and insensitive leadership in the past four years has been the source of immorality and 
impropriety in our society, since what happens in any society is largely a reflection of the 
leadership of that society.”27 As Nwankwo notes, the new Nigerian military leaders often 
claim their regime to be “a child of circumstance and necessity; a regime whose short reign is 
designed to arrest the drift into chaos, restore national peace, order and stability, improve the 
economic well-being of society and its people, and leave behind a prosperous, democratic 
nation.”28 Furthermore, Nwankwo argues that “the military faces a debilitating crisis of 
identity on the assumption of office, for the very fact that being an illegal authority structure, 
it suffers from the trauma of legitimacy and credibility.”29  
In truth, such arguments are overstated. It is probably closer to the truth that despite 
their constitutional illegality, the general population has not always regarded new Nigerian 
military governments as illegitimate. Certainly, a case can be made that neither the Murtala 
Muhammed government nor the Buhari government lacked credibility or suffered from 
perceptions of illegitimacy on assuming office. For instance, without a doubt, the 29 July 
1975 coup that removed General Yakubu Gowon was popularly received “with widespread 
manifestations of relief and elation” through much of Nigeria.30  The incumbent government 
proceeded with hitherto unknown dynamism to attack inefficiency and corruption in public 
life. The military itself as well as the police service, universities, parastatals, judiciary, and 
national, state, and local government bureaucracies were among public institutions that were 
vigorously targeted. The regime addressed thorny issues including the highly controversial 
1973 census, the creation of new states, and the relocation of the capital from Lagos to Abuja.   
Also, the regime set up a Public Complaints Commission to deal with citizens 
grievances against government actions and policies; a 1976 Indigenisation Decree was 
emplaced to empower Nigerian business people; labor organization reforms were 
implemented to create the umbrella Nigerian Labor Congress out of formerly localized and 
fragmented trade union movement; and in regard to foreign policy, the Nigerian government 
for the first time in Nigerian history, shifted away from a low-profile and conservative pro-
Western approach in world affairs to that of not only a leading advocate against racism, racist 
regimes on the continent and neocolonialism but also a prominent supporter of African unity 
and the non-aligned movement.31 Indeed, despite the brevity of his tenure (six months), 
Muhammed’s government was popularly regarded as having accomplished far more before 
his assassination than any preceding government in Nigerian history. Clearly then, it is 
incorrect to perfunctorily dismiss the performance of the Nigerian junta as hopelessly flawed.   
Nevertheless, it should be noted that on balance, military interventions in Nigerian 
politics seem to have done more harm to the Nigerian political economy than any other single 
factor. Aside from staying away from active politics, there is little doubt that the military has 
demonstrated it is incapable of profound and sustainable self-reform that can lead to 
substantive contributions to the effective evolution of democratic practice in Nigeria. Indeed 
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Awolowo noted as much in 1975 when he argued that military rule should be only under 
exceptional circumstances and that “as an essentially corrective regime, and not a 
reconstructing administration with ready and lasting answers to all our political and economic 
ills… It would be too much of a task for it to attempt the massive and never-ending task of 
rebuilding or reconstructing the body politic.”32   
As things now stand, Awolowo’s words have been prophetic.  An elongated and 
largely meaningless military dominance of the Nigerian political landscape merely served to 
precipitate the state’s collapse into unfettered prebendalism as well as the emergence of an 
increasingly predatory and self-interested military class. In his assessment of corruption 
under military rule in Nigeria, former President Olusegun Obasanjo noted: “one of the 
greatest tragedies of military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow 
unchallenged and unchecked even when it was glaring for everyone to see.”33 By weakening 
the structures for rational government, accountability, and democratic participation, Nigeria’s 
military governments inadvertently strengthened the institutions for arbitrary, oppressive, and 
insensitive personal rule. Moreover, the multiplication of states under the military as well as 
its predilection for control has led to the emplacement of structures that have the combined 
effect of simultaneously strengthening the center while effectively emasculating the federal 
character of the Nigerian state.  As Ibrahim observes, “The military are structurally incapable 
of running a federal system because their unified command structure is incapable of 
accepting that a state government, which they consider to be hierarchically subordinate to the 
federal government, could have domains over which the state is sovereign, which, as is 
generally recognized, is the essence of federalism.”34  
Given its nature and structural rigidities, it is not surprising that military planners have 
stringently dictated the Nigerian political transition processes.  A process that ordinarily 
should be consultative and reflective of the broad-based input of civil society and other 
stakeholders was usually initiated with military decrees after little or no consultation with 
persons or groups outside the highest military circles. For instance, under Babangida the 
military arrogated to itself absolute control over the content and pace of the transition 
program, essentially imposing rather than democratically negotiating change. In fact, “it was 
an offence punishable, upon conviction, by five years jail sentence without the option of a 
fine to criticize the transition program as set out by the military authorities.”35 General 
Babangida even sought to define and redefine who was and was not qualified to participate or 
run for office in the political process leading to democratic transition. “The several hiccups of 
the transition program as a result of his frequent arbitrary interventions flowed from this 
arrogant, authoritarian conception of his role as the author and executor of the democratic 
dispensation.”36 The Abuja declaration in October of 1989 abolishing all thirteen political 
parties aptly illustrates the extent to which the military stage-managed and controlled the 
Nigerian transitional processes. In place of the abolished parties, Babangida imposed a two-
party structure and created the two new parties: the Social Democratic Party, “a little to the 
left”; and the National Republican Convention, “a little to the right.” The regime also 
obligated both parties to specific ideological platforms and dependence on state funding.  
Although the Nigerian political class adjusted to, and worked within, the government-
directed process under Babangida, the military eventually annulled the elections at the very 
end of a process that seemingly saw Moshood Abiola emerge as the presidential victor.   
Whatever the merits of the decision – and there were many problems with the voting 
process and voter manipulation despite wide claims by local and international observers that 
it was free and fair – Babangida’s annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election may be 
one of the most important turning points in Nigerian political history. Quite aside from the 
fact that it opened the doors for Sani Abacha to eventually emerge and impose what many 
believe to be the most devious and dictatorial regime in Nigeria’s history,37 the annulment 
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also may have paved the way for an unusual level of militancy and parochialism among the 
Nigerian masses.  Given the severely intense and charged atmosphere in the run-up to the 
elections, a more sensitive government, arguably, may have taken an entirely different 
decision about whether to annul the elections – regardless of the merits and given the broad 
local and international perception that it was reasonably free and fair. As it turned out, the 
military’s capacity to act with fiat and impunity obviated any need for sensitivity and political 
expediency.   
Predictably, this plunged the whole country into an ethnically and regionally inflamed 
post-election crisis despite the installation of Ernest Shonekan – a Yoruba and southerner – as 
the head of an Interim National Government (ING). Many Nigerians from the south of the 
country believed that the military did not allow Abiola to assume office simply because of his 
ethnicity and region of origin. According to Oyediran and Agbaje: “That most of the 
country’s previous elected and unelected political leaders had come from the North gave 
credence to popular perceptions of the annulment as the handiwork of a Northern cabal intent 
on not handing over power to a Southerner.”38 Undoubtedly, the ethno-regional dimension of 
the failed transition “contributed to a resurgence of the sectarian sentiments and resentments 
that Abiola’s nationwide victory appeared to have momentarily transcended.”39  
Beyond the sectarian issues, the problems surrounding Babangida’s transition process 
also aggravated other major problems within the Nigerian political economy such as the 
escalation of corruption and criminality as well as armed robbery, fraudulent schemes known 
as “419” in which Nigerians and foreigners were indiscriminately duped, and the rise of 
Nigerian drug trafficking through private couriers and diplomatic channels.40 The Nigerian 
economy, which was devastated by plummeting world crude oil prices in the late 1980s, was 
virtually pushed over the brink by the structural adjustment program (SAP) initiated by 
Babangida on the insistence of Nigeria’s creditors such as the Paris Club and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The economic decline had led to massive indebtedness and forced two 
successive governments before Babangida to seek, due to cross-conditionality, an IMF stand-
by-agreement that required the regime to emplace far-reaching policies. Conceived as an 
essential pre-requisite and complement to the accomplishment of the political transition 
process, the program soon became increasingly contradictory as “political liberalization 
coincided with the implementation of harsh economic measures in the absence of favorable 
economic performance and/or successful efforts to create a new political coalition…(hence) 
the rise and fall of Babangida’s economic adjustment program generally paralleled the 
changing fortunes of the political transition.”41   
The regime’s handling of public reaction to the harsh results of economic 
restructuring and SAP implementation “led it further and further down the path of 
authoritarianism, vitiating its democratic pretensions and democratizing agenda.”42 As such, 
the nullification of the 12 June 1993 elections served to intensify the deterioration of the 
economic and social conditions of the people and the overall political instability and human 
insecurity in Nigeria.  
 
Nigeria since 1999: Hope Betrayed? 
Like its predecessors, Nigeria’s Third Republic clearly demonstrates the difficulties 
associated with entrenching democratic practice and culture in a severely heterogeneous and 
discordant environment. The basic reason for the difficulties can be traced to the public 
management and governance crises embedded in competing claims by rival elite factions and 
their ethnic and regional constituencies for control of the enormous petroleum rents – 
estimated at US$320 billion between 1970 and 1999 – that accumulate to the state on a 
running basis. Once again, democracy has not been the instant panacea many Nigerians 
hoped for on 29 May 1999. As one astute observer noted in the Vanguard:  
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“When Obasanjo took oath of office, which signaled the end of the 
Abdusalami Abubakar-led military government, the nation was radiating an 
expectant feeling that the sadness and gloom inflicted by a prodigal military 
would soon percolate and be replaced by a regime of hope and prosperity, 
which are the dividends of democracy. They nursed the modest hope that once 
again, the citizenry would have food on their tables, warm their beds at night 
without the perennial fear of being mauled by the bullets of robbers and arrant 
military thugs that strew the streets of the country. The Nigerian citizens 
caressed the hope that by the end of the first term of the present regime, there 
would be enough jobs for the unemployed, that wanton graft and corruption 
and such other tendencies that shrink the ability of the country to rise above a 
midgetry (sic) frame would be wiped off.”43 
 
Unfortunately, the great expectations of many Nigerians have not only been betrayed 
by their own newly elected civilian leaders, but have been replaced, at best, by feelings of 
resignation and disappointment. Despite the presence of elections, Nigerian politics in the 
post-1999 era has been subverted by “despots masquerading as democrats.”44 This has 
resulted in transition without transformation. As Cyril Obi argues: “Nigerian voters have 
been in most instances reduced to spectators, rather than choosers, voting, but not chosen, 
ruled, but not represented, in what has really been the government of a minority (dominant 
elite) over the majority—a democratic-garbed dictatorship.”45 This  belies Adejumobi’s 
definition of elections as “the kernel of political accountability and a means of ensuring 
reciprocity and exchange between governors and the governed.”46 It also educes the 
fundamental question: whose democracy?  
Furthermore, the crisis of democracy in Nigeria is corroborated by the high level of 
electoral violence and irregularities that have speckled the post-1999 era. For example, 
following the April 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria, the Human Rights Watch reported 
that over 800 people were killed and close to 65,000 people displaced in three days of violent 
protests in 12 states in northern Nigeria. Yet, placed in a comparative context to previous 
Nigerian elections, the post-election violence in 2011 was by far the least violent of all 
Nigeria’s elections to date. The violence commenced with popular protests by supporters of 
the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim from the Congress 
for Progressive Change, following the re-election of the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, a 
Christian from the Niger Delta in the south, who was the candidate for the ruling People’s 
Democratic Party.47 The situation is not helped by evidence which suggests that since 1999, 
“the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) through a combination of the control, 
manipulation, organised violence and deployment of federal state power, political institutions 
and resources, has successfully hijacked and subverted the electoral institutions and processes 
to consolidate its hold on to power and public resources.”48 
In many ways, Nigeria’s political problems have been further exacerbated under 
democratic rule by an array of seemingly intractable economic, management, and 
development stress factors. This is brought into bold relief by the bloody and highly divisive 
sectarian violence involving different religious, ethnic, and community groups that have 
become rampant in several states. While issues surrounding ethnicity and religious 
differences have always been well known for their divisive features, the recent epidemic of 
highly violent communal and religious clashes has become as dangerous as it has been 
troubling. Indeed, the introduction of democracy has acted like the release of a pressure 
valve, enabling people to vent their pent-up anger and express themselves more freely. As 
Metumara Duruji noted, Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 “opened up the space for 
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expression of suppressed ethno-religious demands bottled up by years of repressive military 
rule.”49 This goaded major resistance movements in Nigeria, including the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the reawakening of the Movement for the 
Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the endless ethnic confrontations in 
the middle belt region, the incessant religious clashes and riots caused by the implementation 
of Sharia legal code in the North, the rise of the notorious Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in 
the west, as well as the radical Islamist sect Boko Haram from Northeastern Nigeria.  
The situation is compounded by a weak institutional mechanism reinforced by the 
perverted federal structure of the Nigeria state inherited from the military rule that stunts 
efforts aimed at tackling the problems amicably, participatorily, and holistically.50 As Ake 
notes: “more often than not, the post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus 
of violence, and while its base in social forces remained extremely narrow it relied unduly on 
coercion for compliance, rather than authority.”51 Not infrequently, the repressive approach 
of the Nigerian state has aroused, rather than douse, domestic conflict and violent militancy. 
This trigger-happy administrative style of the Nigerian state – an enduring legacy of 
protracted military rule – is clearly demonstrated in the oil conflict in the Niger Delta were 
national security forces were ordered to raze down protesting oil-bearing communities in a 
flagrant violation of the rule of law and due process.52  
The Odi massacre is a prime illustration of the use of brute force by the Obasanjo 
government. Upon assumption of power, President Obasanjo intensified his military option to 
secure the oil fields and pipelines in the Niger Delta through the specially created Nigerian 
Military Task Force with the specific orders to “shoot-to-kill” protesting indigenes. The 
proximate cause of the Odi massacre was the abduction and subsequent killings of seven 
policemen by some chagrined Odi youths. As a response, Obasanjo ordered the Odi punitive 
military expedition (known as Operation HAKURI II) in which over 2000 people were killed, 
thousands displaced and countless properties destroyed.53 Furthermore, “A unit of the 
military – the Joint Task Force (JTF) – is permanently stationed in the oil-rich communities 
of the Niger Delta to protect the oil installations which have been the target of militia 
organisations.”54 This situation is what Ake describes as the “militarisation of commerce” 
and “privatisation of the State.”55 The foregoing led Omotola to describe the Nigerian state as 
“a rentier state dependent almost entirely on revenues from oil, grossly lacking in autonomy 
from vested interests, and relying on the use of force to quench all protests against its 
exploitative and accumulative dispositions, particularly from the oil producing 
communities.”56 
By some accounts, Obasanjo’s democratic government, so called, may not only be 
guilty of mishandling internal crises and ethno-religious tensions in Nigeria but also of 
escalating them. The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and the Centre for Law 
Enforcement Education (CLEEN) took a close look at the government’s handling of seven 
specific cases: the Ife-Modakeke crisis (Osun State), the Umuleri/Aguleri crisis (Anambra 
State), the Odi Massacre (Bayelsa State), the Kaduna crisis (Kaduna State), the Jos Crisis 
(Plateau State), the Benue Massacre (Benue State) and the Odukpani Killings (Cross River 
State). A detailed report released by both organizations, entitled “Hope Betrayed? A Report 
on Impunity and State Violence in Nigeria,” presents damning evidence against the 
government:  
 
“After one of the wildest dictatorships of its history, Nigeria has witnessed the 
re-establishment of democracy on May 29, 1999 which led to great 
expectations among the population for the country’s future. However, the last 
two and half years of elected civilian government in Nigeria have witnessed 
an alarming spate of violence and gross human rights violations. In over 50 
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separate and documented incidents, over 10’000 Nigerians have reportedly 
been victims of extra-judicial executions at an average of over 200 executions 
per incident. Security agents, acting in most cases on direct orders of the 
government, have been responsible for many of the deaths as well as 
accompanying rapes, maiming and torture of thousands of women, the aged, 
children and other defenceless civilians. This situation, in which many 
Nigerians now find themselves, presents a reversal of hope from the high 
expectations and promises that heralded the inauguration of the elected 
government of President Olusegun Obasanjo. Events in Nigeria since few 
measured steps were taken in the first three months of the government, have 
shown that the government has not only failed to abide by its freely 
undertaken obligations under international human rights law but has also 
continued some of the practices that characterized the dark days of military 
rule when human rights violations reigned supreme.”57  
 
Also related to all that is the way an upsurge in armed robbery and other violent 
crimes has laid bare the near criminal inefficiency and incompetence of both the Nigerian 
Police and judicial system, contributing to the dramatic rise in communal, local, and even 
state-sanctioned vigilantism.   
In recent years, however, the Nigerian democracy has struggled to contain the militant 
religiosity of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati (Group Committed to Propagating the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad; commonly called Boko Haram). The group’s avowed aim is 
to rid the country of its corrupt leaders and make Sharia the supreme law of the land. Since its 
eruption in July 2009, the group has spearheaded more devastating attacks in Nigeria than all 
other groups combined.58 These attacks, which show evidence of increasing sophistication 
and geographical expansion, are targeted at Nigeria’s religious and ethnic faultlines in an 
escalating bid to hurt the nation’s stability. Indeed, a flurry of attacks against churches from 
December 2011 through July 2012 points to “a strategy of provocation” through which the 
group seeks to “spark a large scale of sectarian conflict that will destabilize the country.”59 
Embedded in deep tradition of Islamism, the Boko Haram ideology is but one of 
several variants of radical Islamism to have emerged in Northern Nigeria. Its adherents are 
purportedly influenced by the scriptural phrase: “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah 
has revealed is among the transgressors.”60 Boko Haram is vehemently opposed to what it 
sees as Western-based incursion that undermines and erodes traditional values, beliefs, and 
customs among Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria.  Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s 
founder, told the BBC in 2009:  “Western-style education is mixed with issues that run 
contrary to our beliefs in Islam.”61 Elsewhere, the charismatic leader declared: “Our land was 
an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir [infidel] land. The current 
system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs.”62 
Boko Haram became a full-fledged insurgency following violent clashes in 2009 
between the sect and the state’s security agency in Bauchi charged with the responsibility of 
enforcing a new law of wearing crash-helmets by motorcyclists in the country. The 
confrontation began on June 11 in Maiduguri when the security agency and participants in a 
Boko Haram funeral procession clashed over mourners’ refusal to wear motorcycle helmets. 
Members of an anti-robbery task force comprised of military and police personnel opened 
fire on the procession, killing 17 Boko Haram members.63 Mohammed Yusuf demanded 
justice, but “the authorities neither investigated the alleged excessive use of force nor 
apologized for the shooting.”64 On 21 July, the group’s hideout in Bauchi was also ransacked 
by the state security forces and materials for making explosives were confiscated.65 
Following this crackdown, the group mobilized its members for reprisal attacks. On 26 July, 
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Boko Haram members burned down a police station in Dutsen Tanshi, on the outskirts of 
Bauchi, resulting in the death of five Boko Haram members and several police officers were 
injured.66 In response, the military and police raided a mosque and home in Bauchi where 
Boko Haram members had regrouped, killing dozens of the group’s members. The police 
reported that 52 Boko Haram members, two police officers, and a solider were killed in the 
violence in Bauchi.67 
Yusuf vowed revenge, saying he was ready to fight to the death in retaliation for the 
killing of his followers.68 True to his words, he and his followers launched coordinated 
attacks across Maiduguri that night, attacking the police stations and homes of police officers 
(including retired officers). They torched churches and raided the main prison—freeing 
inmates and killing prison guards (ibid). In response, on July 28 and 29 Yusuf’s compound 
was shelled by the Nigerian army and many of his followers were arrested, with at least 
several dozen killed in police custody.69 On July 29, in Postiskum, state security forces also 
raided the group’s hideout on the outskirts of town, killing at least 43 of Yusuf’s followers.70 
The riot was temporarily quelled on July 30 after Nigerian forces captured, and later killed, 
Mohammed Yusuf who they said was hiding in his father-in-law’s goat pen.71 Following the 
death of Yusuf, and the arrest of several of his followers, the group momentarily eclipsed.  
One of the most important elements in understanding the psychology of why people 
become extremists is an appreciation of the psychology of vengeance.72 Relatedly, catalyst 
events (i.e. violent acts that are perceived to be unjust) provide a strong sense of outrage and 
a powerful psychological desire for revenge and retribution. For many Boko Haram 
members, the extrajudicial killing of their founder was the catalyst event that served to 
foment pre-existing animosities toward state security forces. In a video that was released in 
June 2010, Abubakar Shekau – Yusuf’s second-in-command – announced that he had taken 
over leadership of the group and vowed to avenge the deaths of its members.73 In September 
2010, a Boko Haram member told the BBC’s Hausa radio service that “we are on a revenge 
mission as most of our members were killed by the police.”74 In November 2011, during the 
trial of six Boko Haram suspects, one of the group members told the court that their mission 
was to avenge Yusuf’s death.75   
Boko Haram followed through on its revenge mission by attacking the police 
headquarters and the United Nations Headquarters (Abuja) in June 2011 and August 2011 in 
an apparent suicide bombing using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device that 
represented a major leap in the group’s technological development. Notably, since the 
recommencement of Boko Haram attacks in 2010, the group have raided over 60 police 
facilities in at least 10 northern and central states, and Abuja, and killed at least 211 police 
officers.76 Between January and September 2012, at least 119 police officers were killed in 
suspected Boko Haram attacks, more than in all of 2010 and 2011 combined.77 According to 
Boko Haram leaders, these attacks are a response to the extrajudicial killings by the police of 
Mohammed Yusuf and Boko Haram members, as well as for other police abuses including 
“arbitrary arrest,” “torture,” and the “persecution” of its members.78 In a video message 
posted online in January 2012, Shekau stated: “Everyone has seen what the security 
personnel have done to us. Everyone has seen why we are fighting with them.”79 
Following a string of Boko Haram bombings across northern Nigeria, on December 3, 
2011 President Jonathan declared a State of Emergency (SoE), which suspended 
constitutional guarantees in 15 areas of four Northern states. The SoE failed woefully to stem 
the tide of violent attacks in the restive region. Nor did regulation issued in April 2012 that 
gave security forces emergency powers to combat the Boko Haram threat. In fact, during the 
six months that the SoE was operational, the group carried out more violent attacks and killed 
more people than in all of 2010 and 2011 combined.80 These violent attacks are not 
unconnected to the demands of Boko Haram which includes the enthronement of Sharia law 
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in Nigeria, the immediate release of all its prisoners and the prosecution of those responsible 
for the killing of their leader. On December 26, 2011, the day after Boko Haram’s bombing 
of a church in Madalla, Niger State, the group’s spokesperson Abu Qaqa avowed that “There 
will never be peace until our demands are met.”81 
While the overriding goal of Boko Haram is to rid Nigeria of its hopelessly corrupt 
and apostate government and emplace Sharia as the supreme law of the land, the cocktail of 
corruption, poverty, inequality, and unemployment in Northern Nigeria continues to fuel 
members of the group.82 According to Isa, Boko Haram communities have been wrecked by 
“poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, educational backwardness, rising 
numbers of unemployed graduates, massive numbers of unemployed youths, dwindling 
fortunes in agriculture... and the weak and dwindling productive base of the northern 
economy.”83 Thus, Kukah argues that Boko Haram is symptomatic of what happens when 
“the architecture of state are weighed down and destroyed by corruption.”84  
The response of the Nigerian state to Boko Haram has been brutal and 
counterproductive, involving the use of government security forces to “mount aggressive 
pursuit and crackdown of [Boko Haram] members.”85 To this end, the Nigerian state 
established a special Joint Military Task Force (JTF) known as “Operation Restore Order” (or 
JTORO) to eliminate the threat posed by the Islamist group. However, JTF have been 
accused of terrorizing Northern communities and indiscriminately taking the lives of innocent 
people in the name of counter-terrorism.86 For example, in Bornu State, JTF were responsible 
for extralegal killings, unfounded arrests, and “intimidation of hapless Borno residents.”87 
According to Solomon, far from conducting intelligence-driven operations, the JTF simply 
“cordoned off areas and carried out house-to-house searches, at times shooting young men in 
these homes.”88 A recent study of Northern Nigeria by the Human Rights Watch reveals that: 
  
During raids in communities, often in the aftermath of Boko Haram attacks, 
members of the security forces have executed men in front of their families; 
arbitrarily arrested or beaten members of the community; burned houses, 
shops, and cars; stolen money while searching homes; and, in at least one 
case, raped a woman. [In addition] Government security agencies routinely 
hold suspects incommunicado without charge or trial in secret detention 
facilities and have subjected detainees to torture or other physical abuse89  
These ongoing human right abuses and state excesses in Northern Nigeria has not 
only fuelled further reprisal attacks, but also brought about the alienation of many affected 
communities who are now less willing to disclose useful information about Boko Haram. 
According to Keller, an overreliance on “intimidatory techniques not only presents the image 
of a state which is low in legitimacy and desperately struggling to survive, but also in the 
long run can do more to threaten state coherence than to aid it.”90 Moreover, it must be 
considered that the current heavy-handed approach of the Nigerian government may force 
ultra-radical elements within Boko Haram to establish terrorist networks, such as Al-Qaeda 
Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as a form of survival strategy. In the event of 
this happening, the group’s operational base could expand beyond northern Nigeria and their 
target selection could change fundamentally to include attacks on Western interests. This has 
become all the more important not only because of recent attacks on the UN headquarters in 
Abuja which prompted widespread concern that the group was receiving training and support 
from AQIM, but also due to fresh evidence which links the radical sect to developments in 
Mali and the entire Sahel region. Although rooted in the local context, it would seem that 
Boko Haram has been exploiting the growing internationalisation of militancy to get 
externally wired. 
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Conclusion 
Any critical assessment of the evolution of democratic politics and security challenges 
in Nigeria is most likely to point to a troubling political future. The country’s ethno-religious 
cleavages are not just severe and enduring; they have become its principal Achilles heel. 
Every ethnic group is discontented with the Nigerian state for one reason or the other: for the 
oil producing minority in the Niger Delta, it is oil exploitation and environmental 
degradation; for the Igbo it is political marginalisation; for the Hausa-Fulani it is uneven 
development (and the failure to have an uninterrupted control of the federation); for the 
minorities of the north, particularly the Middle Belt it is one of internal colonialism; for the 
Yoruba it is power exclusion.91 The deep divides in the Nigerian society is exacerbated by the 
militarised nature of the state which is characterised by the use (or threat) of violence to settle 
political conflicts, the legitimization of state violence, the continued domination of military 
values over civilian life, the brazen violation of human rights, extrajudicial killings and the 
gross repression of the people.  
In 2012, Nigeria still confronts three basic questions of governance that have dogged 
it since its political independence in October 1960: How should federal institutions be 
designed to manage and contain the country’s countless ethnic, subethnic, regional, and now 
increasingly religious cleavages? How should democratic institutions be reformed and 
bolstered to strengthen accountability and the rule of law? And how can the economy be 
restructured so as to unlock the country’s immense developmental potentials?92 Larry 
Diamond argues that:  
 
Increasingly, the three challenges of [Nigerian] government appear not as a 
coincidence of separate problems but as part of an organic whole. People do 
not trust the state and they do not trust one another. They have no confidence 
in the national project, in the institutions of economic and political life, and in 
the future generally. Consequently, every group, every fraction and family, 
begs and bleeds the state for anything it can, as quickly as it can.93   
Though daunting, this paper argues that the problems in Nigeria are not intractable. 
However, an effective solution for Nigeria requires a capacity not only to generate 
sustainable economic development but also to build and strengthen the institutional 
framework and infrastructure necessary to support and entrench democracy. Such an 
arrangement, among other things, would entail a back-to-basics strategy in regard to 
structural arrangements. Nigeria’s current political managers must now work to return the 
country to its federal roots. The center should shed much of its federal powers in favor of 
states, local governments, and municipalities not only in regard to resources generation but 
also in terms of formal responsibilities. For instance, while the center can legitimately claim 
responsibility for national defense, it should shed all responsibilities for internal security. In a 
decentralized system, it is very likely that many of the states, local government areas, or 
municipalities would have developed more effective systems of policing and security. 
Furthermore, decentralization of national powers for all non-essential functions as well as 
greater local autonomy and self-determination for the federating units would be a more 
effective instrument for dousing not only communal and ethnic tensions and conflicts but also 
the attractiveness of the center as a locus for resource accumulation and distribution. Quite 
aside from re-opening political space, such restructuring of the political landscape would not 
only re-install the link between effort and economic rewards and independence but also 
create better conditions for meaningful social transformation by extending the prospects for 
the development and sustenance of a vibrant civil society and democracy in Nigeria. In this 
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way, a new process of political engagement would be emplaced in Nigeria through which the 
vertical structures of power would be reconfigured to allow the direct channeling and rooting 
of democracy (locally) in the political, social, and cultural organizations of the masses.   
Having said this, it is important to frankly acknowledge that without a transparent 
system of state-based tax revenues (from businesses and individuals) in Nigeria, real power 
will remain in the hands of the federal government, where all the money is. Indeed, as it 
stands now, state governors in Nigeria rely heavily on the huge handouts distributed monthly 
by the federal government, allowing them to shore up their own locally-based patronage. 
Until corruption among state and local politicians is meaningfully reduced (and 
accountability improved), more professional and less corrupt local police forces are in place, 
and state-based budgeting and revenue systems are built, devolving power from the federal 
government to the state governments would only decentralize (and possibly aggravate) the 
troubles in Nigeria in lieu of resolving them.94 Admittedly, the work ahead in Nigeria remains 
daunting. Nevertheless, we must remember that it has not been that long when the prospects 
for a democratic breakthrough seemed such a distant dream.  
 
 
*DANIEL EGIEGBA, AGBIBOA is a PhD Scholar in the School of Sociology, Research 
School of Social Science, Australian National University (ANU). He holds an MPhil in 
Development Studies from the University of Cambridge and an MA in International 
Relations (Summa cum laude) from the University of KwaZulu-Natal. Prior to that, he held a 
BA in Philosophy (Summa cum laude) from St. Joseph’s Institute and a BSocSc in 
Government, Business and Ethics (Summa cum laude) from the University of KwaZulu-
Natal. His works on corruption, security and development in sub-Saharan Africa have 
appeared in several internationally refereed journals and other scholarly outlets, including 
Third World Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Social, Political and Economic 
Studies, Africa Today, Journal of Black Studies, Loyola Journal of Social Sciences, Peace 
Research, and African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review.     
 18
Notes and References 
                                                 
1. Wikiquote, George Santayana, Available at, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/George_Santayana 
(Accessed on 23 September 2012). 
2. Ihonvbere, J. O., 1996. On the Threshold of Another False Start? A Critical Evaluation of 
Prodemocracy Movements in Africa, Journal of Asian and African Studies, XXXI (1-2): 125-
142; Kieh, Jr., G. K., 1996. Democratization and Peace in Africa, Journal of Asian and African 
Studies, XXXI(1-2): 99-111; Nyang’oro, J. E., 1996. Critical Notes on Political Liberalization in 
Africa, Journal of Asian and African Studies, XXXI (1-2): 112-124. 
3. Uzodike, U. O., 1996. Democracy and Economic Reforms: Developing Underdeveloped Political 
Economies, Journal of Asian and African Studies XXXI (1-2): 21-38. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Bing, A., 1991. Salim A. Salim on the OAU and the African Agenda, Review of the African 
Political Economy, 18(50): 60-69; Ihonvbere, J. O., 1996. Militarization and Democratization: 
Nigeria’s Stalled March to Democracy, in K. Mengisteabl and C. Daddieh (eds.),  State Building 
and Democratization in Africa, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, p 124.    
6. Suberu, R. T., 2001. Federalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria. Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press. 
7. Diamond, L., 1991. Nigeria’s Search for a New Political Order, Journal of Democracy 2(2): 5.  
8. Oyediran, O. and Agbaje, A., 1999. Introduction, in O. Oyediran and A. Agbaje (eds.),  Nigeria: 
Politics of Transition and Governance 1986-1996, Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development 
of Social Science Research in Africa, p. 3.  
9. Oyediran, O., 1997. Transition without End: From Hope to Despair—Reflections of a Participant-
Observer, in P.A. Beckett and C. Young(eds.),  Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press; Diamond, L., 1997. Postscript and Postmortem, in L. Diamond, A. 
Kirk-Greene, and O. Oyediran (eds.), Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil 
Society Under Babangida, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
10. The national question involves “how to structure the Nigerian federation in order to accommodate 
[different] groups and guarantee access to power and equitable distribution of resources,” see 
Osaghae, E. E., 1998. Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant, London: Hurst and 
Company, p. 351. 
11. Akinyemi, B., 2001. Devolution of Power: A Prerequisite for National Unity—the need for 
dialogue, in Vanguard newspaper (Nigeria), Available at, 
www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles.htm. (Accessed 12 June 2012). 
12. Cited in Omeje, K., 2006. High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria, 
Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 64. 
13. Afolayan, F., 1997. Nigeria: A Political Entity and a Society, in P. A. Beckett and C. Young (eds.), 
Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, p. 48; Graf, 
W. D., 1988. The Nigerian State, London: James Currey, pp 5-6; Allan, K., 1978. Nation, 
Tribalism and National Language, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 18(3): 402. 
14. Suberu, R. T., 1996. Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum 
Books Ltd., p xi. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Graf, W. D., 1988, pp. 29-30; see also, Uzodike, U. O., Allen, F. and Whetho, A., 2010. Making 
Nigerian Federalism Work: Fixing the Democracy Deficit, Loyola Journal of Social Science 
XXIV(2): 161-185. 
17. Graf, W. D., 1988, p. 133. 
18. Uzodike, U. O., et al., 2010. 
19. Beckett, P. A., 1997. Legitimizing Democracy: The Role of the Highly Educated Elite, in P. A. 
Beckett and C. Young (eds.), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, pp. 116-117. 
20. Suberu, R. T., 1997. Federalism, Ethnicity and Regionalism in Nigeria, in P. A. Beckett and C. 
Young (eds.), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester 
Press, p 356; Diamond, L., 1991. Issues in the Constitutional Design of a Third Nigerian 
Republic, African Affairs, 86(343): 209-226. 
 19
                                                                                                                                                        
21. Uzodike, U. O., et al., 2010. 
22. Conference Report, Available at www.ned.org/forum/reports/nigeria.html. (Accessed on 23 
September 2012).  
23. Soyinka, W., 1996. The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 16. 
24. Omeje, K., 2006, p 27. 
25. Ekineh, A. (1997). Nigeria: Foundations of Disintegration. London: Galago Publishers, p. 272. 
26. Agbaje, A., 1999. The Mass Media and The National Constitutional Conference, 1994-1995, in  O. 
Oyediran and A. Agbaje (eds.), Nigeria: Politics of Transition and Governance, 1986-1996, 
Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development of the Social Science Research in Africa, p 117. 
27. West Africa, 9 January 1984, pp. 56-57. 
28. Nwankwo, C., 1997. The Judiciary System and Human Rights, in L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene 
and O. Oyediran (eds.), Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under 
Babangida, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 31. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Graf, W. D., 1988, p 46. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Joseph, R., 1977. Democratization Under Military Rule and Repression in Nigeria, in P. A. 
Beckett and C. Young (eds.), Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, p 138. 
33. BBC News, May 29, 1999. 
34. Ibrahim, J., 1997.  Obstacles to Democratization in Nigeria, in P. A. Beckett and C. Young (eds.), 
Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria, Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, p 163. 
35. Gboyega, A., 1999. Intergovernmental Relations, in O. Oyediran and A. Agbaje (eds.), Nigeria: 
Politics of Transition and Governance 1986-1996.  Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development 
of Social Science Research in Africa, p 244. 
36. Ibid., p 245. 
37. Osaghae, E. 1998; Agbiboa, D. E. 2011. Leaders or Leeches? Corruption and the Cycle of 
Dysfunction in Nigeria, Loyola Journal of Social Science, XXV(1): 83-102. 
38. Oyediran, O. and Agbaje, A., 1999, p 19.  
39. Suberu, R. T., 1997. Crisis and Collapse: June-November 1993 and Religion and Politics: A View 
from the South, in L. Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and O. Oyediran (eds.), Transition Without End: 
Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida.  Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, p. 285. 
40. Apter, A., 1998, Death and the King’s Henchmen: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Political Ecology of 
Citizenship in Nigeria, in Ogoni’s Agonies: Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Crisis in Nigeria, Trenton, 
NJ and Asmara, Eritrea: Africa World Press, Inc., p 146. 
41. Akinboye, S. O., 2001.  Nigeria’s transition to democracy: Prospects for Consolidation, in  Africa 
Insight 3(3): 5. 
42. Agbaje, A., 1999, p 109. 
43. Vanguard (Nigeria), 2002. Whither Nigeria, July 1 2002, p 6, Available at, 
www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles.htm. (Accessed on 24 September 2012). 
44. Roth, K., 2008. Despots Masquerading as Democrats, New York: Human Rights Watch. 
45. Draft of Paper presented at the Conference on Democratization in Africa: Retrospective and 
Future Prospects, organized by the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) and the 
Leeds University Centre for African Studies (LUCAS) University of Leeds, December 4-5, 2009, 
p 14.   
46. Adejumobi, S., 2000. Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy? International 
Political Science Review, 21: 60 
47. Human Rights Watch, 2011. Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800, May 17, Available at, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800 (Accessed 25 
September 2012). 
48. Obi, C., 2009, p 9. 
 20
                                                                                                                                                        
49. Duruji, M. M. 2010. Democracy and the Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic: Interrogating Institutional Mechanics, Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, 
Issue 15: 92. 
50. Ibid., p 93. 
51. Ake, C., 1992. What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa? Key note Address Presented at the 
Conference on Ethnicity, Society and Conflict, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South 
Africa, p 16. 
52. Duruji, M. M., 2010. 
53. Omotola, J. S., 2006. The Next Gulf? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising Tension 
in the Niger Delta, ACCORD Occasional Paper Series, 1(3): 3-31. 
54. Duruji, M. M., 2010, p 93. 
55. Ake, C., 1992. 
56. Omotola, J. S., 2010, p 7. 
57. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) and Centre for Law Enforcement and Education 
(CLEEN), 2002. Hope Betrayed? A Report on Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence in 
Nigeria, Lagos: OMCT and CLEEN, pp 9-10. 
58. For an excellent treatment of the Boko Haram terrorism, see Forest, J. J. F., 2012. Confronting the 
Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Florida: The 
JSOU Press. 
59. Ibid., p 15. 
60. Thurston, A. (2011). A Threat of Militancy in Nigeria.  Commentary for Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/01threat-of-militancy-in-
nigeria/4yk8. 
61. BBC News. (2009). July, 31. 
62. Daily Trust (Abuja). July 27. 
63. Kwaru, M.I. & Salkida, A. (2009). Funeral Procession Tragedy—Police Shoot 17 in Maiduguri. 
Daily Trust (Abuja). June 12. Available at http://alafrica.com/stories/200906120007.html.  
64. Human Rights Watch. (2012). Spiraling Violence: Boko Haram and Security Forces Abuses in 
Nigeria. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webwcover.pdf., p. 
33 
65. Agbiboa, D. E., (2013). Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective. African 
Conflict and Peacebuilding Review 3(1): 146-159. 
66. Forest, J.J.F. (2012). Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Florida: The JSOU 
Press.  
67. Abubakar, A. (2009). Forty-Two Dead as “Taliban” Sect, Police Clash in Nigeria. AFP, July 26. 
Available at http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/115/article_4499.asp.  
68. Salkida, A. (2009). Sect Leader Vows Revenge. Daily Trust (Abuja). July 27. Available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200907270879.  
69. Human Rights Watch. (2012). Spiraling Violence. 
70. Mukairu, L., & Muhammad, A. (2009). Another 43 Islamic Fanatics Killed in Yobe. Vanguard 
(Lagos). July 30. Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200907300006.html.  
71. Houreld, K. (2009). Muslim Clerics Say Authorities Ignored Warnings before Nigeria Clashes 
Killed 700. The Associated Press, August 2. Available at 
http://article.wn.com/view/2009/08/01/Nigerian_official_says_700_died_in_recent_violence/.  
72. Silke, A. (2008). Holy Warriors: Explaining the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization. 
European Journal of Criminology, 5(1), 99-123.  
73. Pindiga, H.I. & Gusau, I.U. (2010). Dead Boko Haram Leader Re-Emerges in New Video. Daily 
Trust (Abuja). July 1.  
74. Olugbode, M. (2010). Boko Haram Claims Killings in Borno. This Day (Lagos). September 22. 
Available at http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/boko-haram-claims-killings-in-borno/78273/. 
 21
                                                                                                                                                        
75. Nwochiri, I. (2011). We Are on Revenge Mission: Boko Haram Suspects Tells Court. Vanguard 
(Lagos). November 25. Available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/com/201/11/we-are-on-revenge-
mission-boko-haram-suspects-tells-court/. 
76. Human Rights Watch. (2012). Spiralling Violence.  
77. Ibid. 
78. Idris, S. (2012). Boko Haram Claims Responsibility. Weekly Trust (Abuja). January 21. 
79. Sahara Reporters. (2012). January 12. 
80. Human Rights Watch. (2012). Spiralling Violence. 
81. Jimoh, A., Olaniyi, M., Agbese, A., & Idris, H. (2011). Suicide Bombers Spoil Christmas. Daily 
Trust (Abuja). December 26. Available at 
http://dailytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=150866%3Asuicide-
bombers-spoil-christmas&catid=2%3Alead-stories&device=desktop.  
82. Mustapha, A.R. (2012). Boko Haram: Killing in God’s Name. Mail & Guardian, April 5. 
Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-05-boko-haram-killing-in-gods-name.  
83. Isa, M.K. (2010). Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria. In W. Okumu and A. Ikelegbe 
(Eds.), Human Security and State Crises in Africa (pp. 313-340). Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS), p. 330. 
84. Kukah, M.H. (2012). Nigeria: Country as an Emerging Democracy—the Dilemma and the 
Promise. Daily Trust (Abuja), September 9. Available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201209090189.html?viewall=1.  
85. Onuoha, F. C., 2012. Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Extremist Islamic Sect.’ Al Jazeera Centre for 
Studies, February 29, p 5. 
86. Human Rights Watch. (2012). Spiralling Violence. 
87. Solomon, H., 2012. Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram, The RUSI Journal, 
157(4): 9.  
88. Ibid. 
89. Human Rights Watch. (2012). Spiraling Violence 
90. Keller, E. J., 1983. The State, Public Policy and the Mediation of Ethnic Conflict, in D. Rotchild 
and V. Olorunshola, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, p 274. 
91. Momoh, A., 2002. The Philosophy and Theory of the National Question, in A. Momoh and S. 
Adejumobi (eds.), The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, p 24. 
92. Suberu, R. T., 2001, p 1. 
93. Diamond, L., 2001. Foreword, in R. T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria, 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, p xiv. 
94. I am indebted to one of the reviewer’s of this paper for bring this critical point to my awareness. 
